Research spotlight : Why regulations fail - yet persist by Aaron Steelman
R
egulations often do not achieve their intended
effects. In fact, sometimes they produce results
counter to their goals. Why?
In a lecture delivered at the AEI-Brookings Joint Center
for Regulatory Studies in September 2004 and later re-
printed in monograph form, economist Sam Peltzman of
the University of Chicago argues that regulations fail when
they create incentives for “offsetting behavior” — actions
that negate some or all of the regulations’ desired effects. 
Peltzman offers three examples of offsetting behavior
undermining a regulation’s effectiveness. The first is auto
safety, an area in which he has written some influential —
and controversial — papers. The National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 mandated the installation
of seatbelts, collapsible steering columns, and pop-out
windshields. Such devices should make the roads safer,
right? Yes, if their presence did not alter the behavior of
drivers. But Peltzman argued
that the safety devices effec-
tively lowered the cost of
driving dangerously, since driv-
ers would be better protected
in the case of an accident. His
prediction has been largely
supported by subsequent
empirical work. “The actual
effect of the safety regulation
on the death rate is substan-
tially less than it would be if real people behaved like crash
dummies,” he writes.
A second example involves the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The ADA, he argues, has actually
reduced employment opportunities for people with 
disabilities. The logic is as follows. Prior to the ADA,
employers could hire people with disabilities and observe
whether their value to the company exceeded their wages
plus any special costs of accommodating them in the work-
place. If it did, they would be retained. If not, they would be
let go. But now employers are wary of taking a chance on
hiring someone with a disability because companies who
terminate a disabled worker are potentially subject to large
penalties for employment discrimination. Of course, the
companies may also be subject to penalties for not hiring
the disabled worker in the first place, but Peltzman argues
that such discrimination cases are harder to prove.
Peltzman’s third example has a Fifth District connec-
tion. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 is designed to
protect animals on verge of extinction and their habitats.
One such animal is the red-cockaded woodpecker, native 
to the commercial forests of North Carolina. Owners of
forests where the red-cockaded woodpecker lives are 
forbidden to remove trees in those forests. But, of course,
woodpeckers fly around and establish nests in nearby
forests. If you own a nearby forest, “your incentive is very
clear — cut down all those trees now! If you wait and 
your land becomes habitat for this species, your lumber 
will be lost.” This is not good for the birds. Nor is it good
for the owner of the forest, who might have preferred 
to allow the trees to grow larger before removing them.
So if such regulations fail to meet their objectives, why
do they persist? In some cases, regulations benefit a 
relatively small group of people who lobby for their 
survival. Consider the ADA. It may harm people with 
disabilities who are looking for jobs, while helping disabled
people who are already employed. The latter obtain “better
working conditions, no lower pay, and an option on a future 
antidiscrimination complaint
to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission,”
Peltzman writes. “The benefi-
ciaries know who they are. 
The victims … often do not.”
This explanation is con-
sistent with many other case
studies of the political economy
of regulation. But Peltzman
argues that a more powerful
force is at work. The enormous progress characteristic of 
a society with a well-functioning economy can hide the 
failures of regulation. “As long as the thing being regulated
is seen to be working tolerably well — and that will often 
be the case in a growing economy — then the regulation is
safe politically,” writes Peltzman.
If correct, does Peltzman’s argument render economic
analysis irrelevant to policy discussions? After all, if the
public sees only what is before them and not how life might
be different, and perhaps even better, in the absence of 
regulation — the type of thing that economic analysis tries
to do — they are unlikely to push for change. 
Peltzman is cautiously optimistic. “It may be true that
economic analysis cannot all by itself change a well-
entrenched mode of regulation. But economic analysis does
often, I believe, play an important catalytic role when regu-
latory issues become politically salient.” In other words,
when a regulation’s failures become manifestly obvious —
as was the case with the regulation of the transportation
industry in the 1970s — economic analysis can bolster 
the case for revising or repealing that regulation. RF
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